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VOTING TRUSTS CURRENTLY OBSERVED
VOTING TRUSTS CURRENTLY OBSERVED'
By COLEMAN BURKE*W HEN Mr. Justice Douglas was serving on the Securities and
Exchange Commission, he stated that the voting trust 2 "as
currently observed is little more than a vehicle for corporate kid-
napping" and a device whereby promoters may eat the cake and
have it too.- Such caustic condemnation of corporate voting
trusts is not novel. 4 Several writers in the past have urged their
elimination5 and many courts have used vivid language when in-
validating particular trusts.6 However, this corporate device has
weathered all former storms and it is believed that there are as
many voting trusts in existence today as ever before. Thus one
might be inclined to accept Mr. Justice Douglas' comment as the
*Member of the New York bar. Associated with the firm of Burke &
Burke, New York City.
'I am indebted to Professor Ralph J. Baker of the Harvard Law School
and to James P. Johnson, member of the Illinois Bar, for valuable aid on
this article. Mr. Johnson writes that he has recently had the temerity to
draw a voting trust agreement in Illinois, where all voting trusts are sus-
pect. See infra, p. 352.
-A voting trust may be defined as a transfer of the legal title and voting
power of shares of stock of a corporation to a trustee or trustees for a
limited period for the purpose of concentrating control of such corpora-
tion in the hands of fewer persons than the whole number of its share-
holders. Judge Baldwin reminds one of Dr. Johnson at his best, in defining
the voting trust as "an attempt by some of the corporators to bargain away
their right to share in the control of the corporate business without con-
suiting the wishes or welfare of the rest." Baldwin, Voting Trusts, (1891)
1 Yale L. J. 1, 11.
sDemocracy in Industry and Finance, address of William 0. Douglas
before The Bond Club of New York, New York City, March 24, 1937,
p. 12-one of the so-called "Wall Street nightmares." The writer won-
dered whether the SEC hoped to extend the "Lindbergh Law" (18
U.S.C.A. Sec. 408 a-c (Supp. 1939)) so as to protect corporations. Voting
trusts, however, have been approved by the SEC in at least two cases.
In the Matter of Great Lakes Utilities Company, (1937) 2 SEC 129, Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 595; In the matter of The United Telephone
and Electric Company et al., (1938) 3 SEC-, Holding Company Act
Release No. 1187. Despite these instances of approval of voting trusts
in connection with reorganizations, it is apparent that voting trusts are
not yet looked upon with enthusiasm by the members of the SEC. See
Note 123, infra.
4For a notable example, see Untermyer, A Legislative Program to
Restore Business Freedom and Confidence (1914) 24.
51bid.; (1897) 56 Am. St. Rep. 110, 138, 152-3; cf. Smith, Limitations
on the Validity of Voting Trusts, (1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 627, 636.
GVanderbilt v. Bennett, (1887) 6 Penn. Co. Ct. 193, 199; Starbuck v.
Mercantile Trust, 60 Conn. (1890) 553, 579, 24 Atl. 34, 41; Bridgers v.
First National Bank of Tarboro, (1910) 152 N. C. 293, 301, 67 S. E.
770, 772.
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conclusion of one who was continually engaged by virtue of his
office in exposing corporate abuses. But such criticism from the
man who has been in a short space of time professor of corporate
finance at Yale, member and chairman of the SEC, and Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, well deserves an answer. It is the
main purpose of this article to show why the voting trust device,
though criticized and abused, should receive the approval of all
our legislatures and courts.
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
During the past decade of depression, the corporate voting
trust device has been widely used and sometimes abused. It has
been taken to court on numerous occasions. It has been paraded
before legislative investigating bodies. It has been the subject
of statutes in twelve states.7
The story of the voting trusz over the past fifty years is quite
similar to this thumbnail sketch of the last ten, but it is necessary
to outline the history of voting trust law in order to reveal early
errors and to provide a background for recent and future de-
velopments. The first voting trust which occasioned litigation
was formed by shareholders of the Pacific Mail Steamship Com-
pany in 1864, and was held to be valid three years later with little
discussion of the problems which subsequently have troubled the
7 Perhaps the most significant development has been the adoption
of the following general statutes validating voting trusts: California, Civ.
Code (Deering 1933) sec. 321a (1931) ; Colorado, Stat. Ann. (Michie
1935) ch. 41, sec. 40 (1931) ; Idaho, Code Ann. (1932) tit. 29, sec.
29-134 (1929) ; Louisiana, Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart. 1932) sec. 1113 (1928) ;
Michigan, Comp. Laws (Mason Supp. 1935) sec. 10135-34 (1929); Min-
nesota, Stat. (Mason Supp. 1936) sec. 7492-26 (1933); New Hamp-
shire, Pub. Laws (1926) ch. 226, sec. 15 as added Laws 1931, ch. 104,
secs. 15-20 (1931); Pennsylvania Stat. (Purdon 1936) tit. 15. sec. 2852-
511 (1933); Philippine Islands, Corporation Law, sec. 36 (1928); Ten-
nessee, Code Ann. (Williams 1936) sec. 3733 (1929) ; Washington, Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Remington 1936) sec. 3803-29 (1934); West Virginia, Code
Ann. (Michie 1932) sec. 3085 (1931). Before 1928, similar statutes
had been passed in New York, Maryland, Delaware, Nevada, Florida,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Arkansas in that order. For citations see footnotes
61, 62 and 63. Many states have statutes permitting fiduciaries to vote
stock held by them, but in Virginia, Massachusetts and Kentucky for ex-
ample the validity of voting trusts is recognized by common law principles
and not by reason of such statutes. See Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security
Life Ins. Co., (1910) 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412 and Virginia Code of 1936,
sec. 3800; Mass. Laws Ann. (1935) oh. 155, sec. 21; Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll
1936) sec. 552.
Sometimes a voting trust is authorized by special act of the legislature.
Ariz. Laws 1934 (3d Spl. Sess.) ch. 6, sec. 5; Maricopa County Municipal
Water Conservation District No. 1 v. La Prade, (1935) 45 Ariz. 61,
40 P. (2d) 94 (upholding the Arizona statute).
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courts." Voting trusts sprang to prominence during the period
of vast industrial expansion and consolidation toward the latter
part of the nineteenth century. In the numerous attempts to
monopolize various fields of industry, the voting trust was fre-
quently used, and trusts acquired an opprobrious connotation
which was probably in no small degree responsible for the dis-
approval of voting trusts shown by courts and others. The
name "voting trust" was no small handicap in early "trust busting"
days." Add to that the fact that most of the early voting trusts over
which litigation arose involved monopolistic, fraudulent or other
illegal purposes, and it is small wonder that the courts declared
many voting trusts to be illegal in the adolescent period of voting
trust law. As usual, what was legitimate and without fraud
rarely was dragged into court, and therefore the law books do
not show us the large number of voting trusts which were oper-
ated successfully. What cases there were, however, were taken
as authority for the general invalidity of voting.trusts, and their
influence is still felt.
The famous Shepaug Votifig Trust Cases'0 decided together
in 1890 in Connecticut are a perfect example of the paralyzing
effect which misconceived and misapplied opinions, handed down
in the formative period of a new field of law, have upon later
cases. Almost all commentators and judges have cited these cases
as holding that voting trusts are illegal per se on the ground that
it is against public policy to separate the voting power from the
beneficial ownership of stock. The Shepaug opinions set forth
no such blanket condemnation of voting trusts, although few
voting trusts could run the gauntlet of dicta laid down therein. A
syndicate wanted to gain control of the Shepaug, Litchfield &
Northern Railroad Company so as to extend the line and obtain
the contracts for construction work. A majority of the stock
was purchased and placed in a voting trust, a trust company hav-
ing legal title to the stock but voting it as directed by certain
"Brown v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., (C.C.N.Y. 1867) 5 Blatch, 525,
Fed. Cas. No. 2025.
Ot is probably true that the name "voting trust' has been no such
handicap in more recent years. Recurring waves of criticism of voting
trusts have coincided with the anti-trust legislation of the first Wilson
administration and the anti-trust, anti-bigness drive of the present ad-
ministration, but in these periods the voting trust has been attacked not
because of the implications of its name but because it is (admittedly) one
method of concentrating control of a corporation.
'
0Starbuck v. Mercantile Trust and Bostwick v. Chapman, (1890)
60 Conn. 553, 24 Atl. 34.
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members of the syndicate. The Connecticut court used very
broad language in granting complete relief to certain transferees
of the voting trust certificates who had brought suit to revoke the
trust and obtain stock for their certificates. The language of
the court has been quoted but misapplied time and again. It
should be noted that the purpose of the Shepaug voting trust was
fraudulent, that the voting was to be controlled by those who were
neither the beneficial nor the legal owners of the stock and that
the court admitted that there was nothing illegal per se about
"pooling" agreements.11 The Shepaug cases should have been
limited to their own facts, and it is significant that the opinion
in an important later Connecticut case 12 involving a voting trust
problem did not even cite them. No blanket prohibition upon a
divorce of the voting power from beneficial ownership was laid
down, and it has been unfortunate for the progress of the law
of voting trusts that almost all commentators and courts which
have cited the Shepaug cases have so often failed to recognize
that fact.
Toward the close of the century voting trusts frequently
were put to what has been until recently their commonest use.
Many of the reorganization problems which resulted from the
period of rapid expansion and overcapitalization of the railroads,
and, to a lesser extent, of other industries, were solved by the
use of voting trusts. The much reorganized Erie Railroad was
subject to a number of them; the Northern Pacific was reorgan-
ized by a spectacularly successful voting trust, voluntarily ter-
minated by the trustees, all partners in J. P. Morgan & Co., when
they felt it was no longer necessary.' 3
Voting trusts also have been used in many other ways, of
which a few should be mentioned: In connection with the pro-
motion of new corporations' 4 or the development of patents, to
establish continuity of control or management, to protect those
furnishing new money, and to insure or facilitate the accomplish-
ment of some particular corporate or public object. Recently
William Randolph Hearst turned over to Judge Shearn as voting
trustee under a ten year voting trust the common stock in his
top holding company as a part of the program of rearranging his
"At p. 581.
'
2See Clark v. National Steel & Wire Co., (1909) 82 Conn. 178, 72
Atl. 930.
-8See (1900) 71 Com. & Fin. Chron. 989.
14 "This is now the occasion for the most frequent use of the voting trust."
Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (3d ed. 1934) 389.
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pyramid of possessions, in anticipation of life's three (no longer
two!) certainties-death, taxes, and death taxes.1
With the turn of the century there came a change of attitude
toward voting trusts. Courts began to admit that voting trusts
might be legal under certain circumstances. In 1901 New. York
passed the first general statute' permitting the creation of voting
trusts with very slight restrictions. Writers took up the cudgels
in favor of the legality of voting trusts. And in 1910, the Vir-
ginia court gave unqualified approval to voting trusts in Carnegie
Trust Company v. Security Life Insurance Co., 7 an excellent
analysis of the voting trust device which has been cited many
times with approval.
Unfortunately, just as the judicial portals were opening to
let in the voting trust device they were blown shut again in
some quarters by another burst of adverse sentiment. In the
same year, 1910, the North Carolina court declared voting trusts
to be illegal per se, following earlier precedents in that state.'8
The following year we find the unqualified dictum of Vice-
Chancellor Howell of New Jersey: "I am of the opinion that it
is unlawful and a gross violation of the public policy of this state
to permit . . . separation of the voting power of corporate
stock from its ownership."'1  The so-called "voting trust cases"
20
in New Jersey and the leading case of Warren v. Pim2 had estab-
lished that voting trusts were merely prima facie illegal in that
jurisdiction. Then in 1913 came an investigation of banking and
finance by a sub-committee of the House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency under the Chairmanship of
'
0 Davis, Mr. Hearst Steps Down, in the Saturday Evening Post,
August 27, 1938, pp. 5, 65. The voting trust was also undoubtedly part
of the program to "save the empire." See Dusk at Santa Monica, Time,
March 13, 1939, p. 49.
'oNew York, Laws 1901 ch. 355.17(1910) 111 Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412.
'sBridgers v. First Nat'l Bank of Tarboro, (1910) 152 N. C. 293,
67 S. E. 770; Harvey v. Linville Imp. Co., (1896) 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E.
489; Sheppard v. Rockingham Power Co., (1909) 150 N. C. 776, 64 S. E.
894.
'
9Bache v. Central Leather Co., (1911) 78 N. J. Eq. 484, 485, 81
Atl. 571, 572.20Cone v. Russell, (1891) 48 N. 3. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847; White v.
Thomas Tire Co., (1893) 52 N. J. Eq. 178, 28 At!. 75; Clowes v.
Miller, (1900) 60 N. J. Eq. 179, 47 Atl. 345; Kreissl v. Distilling Co.,(1900) 61 N. J. Eq. 5, 47 Atl. 471; Chapman v. Bates, (1900) 61 N. J.
Eq. 658, 47 At!. 638.
21(1904) 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 At!. 773 (here a "fifty-year" voting
trust vas declared void by a court divided seven to six; Swayze, J., de-
livered a masterful dissent).
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Arsene P. Pujo. Mr. Samuel Untermyer as counsel for the Pujo
Committee led a crusade against the voting trust and voting
trustees which was not without effect.22 Indeed, in 1915 the
Illinois court echoed the opinion of the North Carolina court2 3
and threw the Illinois bar into a confusion over the subject from
which it has not yet recovered.24 Finally, the Public Service
Commission of the state of Missouri took an unqualified position
against the validity of voting trusts in 1916, in connection with
the proposed plan of reorganization of the Santa Fe Railroad. '
In 1918 Mr. I. Maurice Wormser wrote an able article which
stated the case for voting trusts.26 Mr. Wormser's article, how-
ever, failed to go far enough. It supported the general validity
of voting trusts but only "provided the propriety and reasonable-
ness of its object affirmatively appear. . . ,--7 This puts the
burden of establishing good faith upon the shareholders enter-
ing the combination, contrary to a basic principle of both our
civil and criminal law. If it is once admitted that voting trusts
are legal, the burden of establishing that a particular combina-
tion is for an unfair purpose mus'z rest with those who so assert.2
Despite this shortcoming, the Wormser article probably helped
to stem the tide of renewed opposition to voting trusts. Since
1918 no court has declared voting trusts to be illegal per se and
North Carolina is now the only state in which all voting trusts
are prohibited. In this respect North Carolina seems as unpro-
gressive as is her sister Carolina with respect to divorce. 29  It is
22The dissolution of the voting trusts of the Bankers Trust Com-
pany and the Guaranty Trust Company is generally attributed to the ac-
tivities of the Pujo Committee. Owen Committee of U. S. Senate 1914,
Testimony p. 77. See also Pujo Committee of House of Representatives,
1913, Testimony Vol. 3, pp. 1824-26. The Pujo Committee reported that
all voting trusts should be expressly prohibited. Id. cit. Report, p. 164.
23See Luthy v. Ream, (1915) 270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373; also
Venner v. Chicago City Railvay Co., (1913) 258 Ill. 523, 101 N. E.
949; Babcock v. Chicago Railways Co., (1927) 325 Ill. 15, 155 N. E. 773.24See Finklestein, Voting Trust Agreements, (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev.
344, 358; 5 Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. ed. 1931) sec. 2080.
25In re St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Reorg., (1916) 3 Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 664, 712, 720-1.26Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling
Agreements, (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 123.
27Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling
Agreements, (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 123, 136. See also Cone v. Russell,(1891) 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847, :350.2sSee dissent by Swayze, J., in Warren v. Pim, (1904) 66 N. J.
Eq. 353, 402, 59 Atl. 773, 794. This dissent was the foundation for the
later New Jersey statute approving votinq trusts, and so is entitled to
great weight. New Jersey, Rev. Stat. (1937) sec. 14: 10-10.2sDivorce is not allowed in South Carolina. South Carolina, con-
stitution, art. 17, sec. 3.
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true that some of the opinions still include long paragraphs on the
history of voting trusts, and qualify legality by time-worn judicial
shibboleths, invented years ago when condemnation of voting
trusts first began to soften. However, representative cases dur-
ing the past decade in both the United States and Canada uni-
formly have admitted or assumed the legality and validity of
voting trusts in the absence of a fraudulent or illegal purpose.30
Furthermore during the same period the number of jurisdictions
having general statutes allowing the creation of voting trusts has
increased from eight to twenty, and former fears that the stat-
utes in Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York and Ohio would be restrictively construed by
hostile courts 1 have not materialized.
Whether or not the legislative and judicial trend in favor of
the validity of voting trusts will continue is within the realm
of conjecture. The writer believes it should and will continue.
We have already seen that voting trusts have weathered adverse
business cycles, dicta, and epithets before. It is safe to say that
they will do so again. There are three reasons why this may be
asserted with confidence. In the first place, voting trusts have
proved to be a most useful aid to corporate finance and manage-
ment. Second, the legal arguments used against the device are
specious, if not patently unsupportable. Third, the device has
not been abused in enough instances to require state legislation
outlawing it.
We have already seen the various ways in which voting trusts
have proved useful, so let us briefly examine the arguments
against their validity.82  They are as varied as the colors of
Joseph's coat.
"°The following cases come from jurisdictions which have no general
voting trust statutes: Alderman v. Alderman, (1935) 178 S. C. 9, 181
S. E. 897; Sagalyn v. Meekins Packard & Wheat, Inc., (1935) 290 Mass.
434, 195 N. E. 769; Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sloss, (1934)
229 Ala. 26, 155 So. 371; Warner Bros. Pictures v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner
Ins. Agency Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 804; Smith v. Bramwell,(1934) 146 Or. 611. 31 P. (2d) 647; Seward v. American Hardware Co..(1933) 161 Va. 610, 171 S. E. 652; Re Firstbrook Boxes, Ltd., [1936]
Ont. Rep. 15, 1 Dom. L. Rep. 92. See earlier Canadian case apparently
holding a voting trust irrevocable, Christin v. Blondin, (1922) 66 Que.
S. C. 446 (a good chance to test one's Canadian French). The validity
of voting trust agreements seems not to have been questioned in Eng-
land. See Finklestein, Voting Trust Agreements, (1926) 24 Mich. L.
Rev. 344, footn. 1.
31See Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, (1928) 37
Yale L. J. 445, 464.32For excellent answers to some of the arguments, see Harriman,
Voting Trusts and Holding Companies, (1904) 13 Yale L. J. 120; and
Swayze, J., in Warren v. Pim, (1904) 66 N. J. Ea. 353, 402, 59 Ati. 773, 794.
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It has been argued that voting trusts are a method of violating
statutory limitations on the period for which proxies may be
created. This contention overlooks the fact that a voting trust
is not an agency, not a mere power of attorney, but rather "an
outright conveyance of the stock, conditioned upon certain cov-
enants made by the voting trustees and duties imposed upon
them." 3
A few have objected that voting trusts are an invalid restraint
on alienation, and violate the rule against perpetuities. Since the
beneficial ownership of stock placed in a voting trust is almost
invariably freely transferable, the argument that there is a re-
straint on alienation is untenable.3" The rule against perpetuities
is inapplicable to a voting trust, because there is no question of
the vesting of contingent interests.35
It has often been urged that a voting trust is illegal, or at least
revocable, unless it is an active trust, or unless the agreement is
supported by consideration, or unless the trust is coupled with an
interest in the stock. In some cases these terms have been used
side by side and apparently synonymously. 36 In others, courts
have used one term when the decision seemed dearly based on
what most courts have discussed under different terminology. 37
Unfortunately few courts or writers have carefully analyzed their
different import, and their connection with the law of trusts, con-
tracts and agency from which they are respectively drawn. Found
ad niauseam in the cases, they seem to be a magic triad by which
courts strike down particular voting trusts. They are the glossy
formulae with which courts reach results. Judged by ordinary
standards of law, most voting trusts would seem to be active
and supported by consideration. In the absence of other duties
33See Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pool-
ing Agreements, (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 123, 135.34
"It is true that the voting power of A's stock cannot be alienated
without B's consent; but there is no more restraint on alienation than
B's easement in A's land is a restraint on the alienation of the land."-
Harriman, Voting Trusts and Holding Companies, (1904) 13 Yale L. J.
109, 113.35Someone has said that the rule is no more applicable to a voting
trust, a present vested interest, than to the old United States Beef Trust.
However, early voting trusts may have seemed proper subjects for the
rule. In one case the trust might terminate twenty years after the last
survivor of the then living descendants of Her Majesty (Queen Victoria)
died. See Warren v. Pim, (1904) 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 AtI. 773.36See People v. Burke, (1923) 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837; Thompson
Starrett Co. v. E. B. Ellis Granite Co., (1912) 86 Vt. 282, 84 Atl. 1017.
3?For a notable example, see Clark. v. Foster, (1917) 98 Wash. 241,
167 Pac. 908.
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which would unquestionably make a voting trust active the duty
of voting trustees to vote3s (or to decide not to vote!) and the
duty to pay over dividends, or either one alone, should be suf-
ficient to make the trust active. Sufficient consideration is found
in the mutual promises of the shareholders not to revoke39 and
in the interest in his own stock which each shareholder gives
to his fellow shareholders. It is often difficult to tell what courts
mean when they state that a voting trust is illegal or at least re-
vocable unless coupled with an interest. This usually means that
a voting trust may be formed only for the protection of creditors;
it may also mean that the voting trustees must be shareholders
themselves, or that they must have an option to purchase any
stock placed in the trust.40  In any case, an "interest" is required
as a matter of law only if a voting trust is an agency, a premise
which we have already seen is unsound. 41 But even if we proceed
on the false premise that a voting trust is an agency, we find in
most voting trust arrangements that the trustees have an inter-
est which couples with the power to vote and makes it irrevocable.
42
Some contend that voting trusts lead to minority control of
a corporation. If minority control means control by a few per-
sons, 43 it is in a sense true that a corporation, while a voting trust
is in effect, is controlled by a few persons, but in such a case
the objection to control of the corporation by voting trustees who
are selected by a majority of the voting shares of stock, is
scarcely stronger than an objection to control of a corporation by
3SAs suggested by Chief Justice Holmes, "It might be held that the
duty of voting incident to the legal title made such a trust an active
one in all cases." Brightman v. Bates, (1900) 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E.
809; see also Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., (1910) 111
Va. 1, 68 S. E. 412.
3DCarnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co. (1910) 111 Va. 1,
68 S. E. 412. A California statute permitting voting trusts in agri-
cultural marketing corporations expressly made the mutual promises of
the participating shareholders sufficient consideration to support a vot-
ing trust agreement. California, Stat. 1919, p. 123.
40Boyer v. Nesbitt, (1910) 227 Pa. St. 398, 76 At. 103.
41See supra, p. 354.
42The trustees sometimes represent a creditor, or are shareholders, or
have a right of first refusal of the stock. It has been suggested that the
trustees' interest to see the trust properly executed and the reciprocal
rights of the participating shareholders preserved is a sufficient interest
to support the power. See Warren v. Pim, (1904) 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 410, 59
Atl. 773, 794. See also Restatement of Agency, sec. 138, comment c and
illustration 5.
43See Note, (1928) 16 Calif. L. Rev. 537, 540. The writer of the
note states that, ". . . the voting trust offers the control of a selected
minority, which is fixed, responsible and open, instead of secret and
fluctuating."
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its board -of directors. If minority control means control by
less than half of the voting shares of stock of a corporation, 44 the
contention seems unwarranted. In most voting trusts, the vot-
ing trustees, who possess powers of discretion as to voting and
other matters, have been selected and approved by a majority of
the voting shares of stock.45 In some instances, it is true that
the policy followed by voting trustees is to be formulated by a
majority of the deposited shares of stock, all of which together
may constitute only a minority of the total amount of the stock.
In such a situation there seems to be nothing inherently wrong in
extending the rule of the majority to the second degree, especially
since the original majority agrees to govern the trust by majority
rule.
Nevertheless, minority control in and of itself is no such
bugbear as many writers would have us think. As a practical
matter, it is hard to escape in large corporations with many
stockholders. In small corporations minority control by a voting
trust which holds the balance of power may in many cases prove
to be the most democratic form oi operation. By forming a voting
trust a large group of stockholders with interests which, though
separately small, total almost half the stock outstanding may be
able to protect themselves against the complete domination of
the corporation by one or two large minority stockholders. It
is hard to understand how public policy is violated by permitting
small stockholders to join forces for a period of more than one
year in order to make their union effective. Moreover, sup-
pose forty per cent of the stock of a corporation is concentrated
in a voting trust and together with a small percentage of the re-
maining, but ununited stock, actually controls the corporation
for the duration of the trust. It is difficult to see why such con-
trol by a combination of three or three hundred stockholders in a
voting trust should be deemed more objectionable than the same
control by a single stockholder owning or purchasing a similar
forty per cent of stock.
It has been urged that a voting trust deprives those share-
holders not parties to an agreement of a voice in the management.
This argument overlooks the principle of cumulative voting
44This is the meaning given to "minority control" by most writers.
See Note, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 434; Miller, Voting Trusts, (1929)
4 Ind. L. J. 600, 603.
45Miller, Voting Trusts, (1929) 4 Ind. L. J. 600, 603: "Since a major-
ity of the stockholders were in favor of vesting control in a trustee, the
action by the trustee is the action by the majority."
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wherever it exists. Where cumulative voting is not in force,
the objection involves the "fallacy of division." Each share of
stock may have a potential voice in management, but ordinarily
this potentiality is not realized until the one share becomes part
of a controlling majority. Moreover, this objection does not
exist in the multitude of cases where either statutes or agree-
ments, or both, provide that all shareholders of the same class
or classes for which a voting trust agreement is drawn may par-
ticipate in the agreement if they so desire.46 In such cases a non-
depositing minority shareholder is in practically the same posi-
tion as if there were no voting trust.
Although many courts have found the foregoing arguments
against voting trusts to be unsupportable, all too often they have
taken refuge in public policy, a fertile field of judicial indecision.
The reason most often given for condemning voting trusts is
that it is against public policy to separate the voting power from
the ownership of stock. This is the heritage of the Shepaug Vot-
ing Trust cases and their "ancestors. '47  In many jurisdictions
where voting trusts have run their checkered career through the
courts an abhorrence of the separation of the voting power from
the ownership of stock has persisted. It originated in the sup-
posed duty which one shareholder owed to his fellow shareholders
and to the corporation. The notion that each shareholder owes
a duty to his fellow shareholders to exercise his own personal
discretion, judgment, and voting power for the best interests of
a corporation is a judicial relic from the days when proxies were
generally invalid, and the corporation meeting ran like a New
England Town Meeting. Since then a century of kaleidoscopic
change has followed. The voting of shareholders nowadays is
a formality exercised by proxy almost entirely, and personal
judgment is not often used.48  Moreover, it is generally said that
everyone may "use his position as a stockholder solely for his
own benefit." 46  This is subject of course to the limitation that
40Voting trust statutes in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Philippine Islands, Ten-
nessee and Washington so provide. Under the Colorado statute an agree-
ment "must" contain such a provision. The New Hampshire statute puts
a limit of six months on the time within which shares may be transferred to
the trustees after the voting trust agreement is filed. See note 74, infra.
47See Taylor v. Griswold, (1834) 14 N. J. L. 222 and dictum of
Chief Justice Shaw in Fuller v. Dame, (1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 472, 484.
4sIt is too early to know what effect the new SEC proxy rules will
have. SEC Regulation X-14. Of course hundreds of corporations are
not subject to such rules.
40Lord Robertson in Bradley v. Carritt, [1903] A. C. 253, 269. See
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the majority may not exercise its authority fraudulently for its
advantage and at the expense of the minority. Furthermore, a
shareholder owes no duty to a corporation other than to refrain
from defrauding it by using his power of control to its injury.'
It seems apparent, therefore, that the shareholder has fulfilled
his whole duty to his fellow shareholders and the corporation
when he has done with his shares what he thinks is best. To deny
him the right to place his shares in a voting trust would only be
hampering the free exercise of his personal judgment for which
the opponents of voting trusts have so loudly clamored.
Some writers try to show that there has not been a complete
separation of voting power from stock ownership rather than to
answer the archaic arguments which brought the rule into being.
How easy it is to fall into this error is shown by the fact that
Mr. Wormser in the article already referred to,5 tried to persuade
his readers that the separation argument "is based upon an un-
sound premise, because in the case of most voting trusts, the
voting power follows the legal ownership of the stock.15 2 It is
true that in every voting trust prcperly so called, the voting power
follows the legal ownership of the stock. Mr. Wormser merely
stated the obvious without answering the supposed objection.
What some courts and writers have objected to is the separa-
tion of the voting power from the beneficial ownership. The
real answer to the objection seems to be that there is no mystical
unity between the voting power and the ownership of stock. They
are no more "one" for all purposes nowadays than are husband
and wife. Separation between the two takes place in a number
of situations: (1) The universal permission of proxy voting con-
stitutes an approval of such separation. If a shareholder may
vote blindly by proxy there seems to be no real reason why he
should not be allowed to vote with others by trustee.53  (2)
Trustees and pledgees are very generally empowered by statute
also Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., (1890) 123 N. Y. 91, 97, 25
N. E. 201, 202; United States Steel Corp. v. Hodge, (1903) 64 N. J.
Eq. 807, 54 Atl, 1. This proposition does not permit a shareholder to
"sell" his votes in exchange for an executive position in the company.
Cone v. Russell, (1891) 48 N. J. Eq. 208, 21 Atl. 847.
5OSee Harriman, Voting Trusts and Holding Companies, (1904) 13
Yale L. J. 109, 115 and authorities cited in footnote 38 thereof.53Wormser, Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agree-
ments, (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 123.
"
2Wormser, Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agree-
ments, (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 123, 134. See also the ingenious argument
in 5 Fletcher, Corporations (Penn. ed. 1931) sec. 2065, footn. 35.53See (1910) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 51, 52.
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to vote stock registered in their names. (3) It often happens
that stock is transferred absolutely in the period when the stock
transfer books are closed before a meeting. Statutes provide
that only those may vote who are registered on the books of
the corporation before a certain day. In such a case the trans-
feror has no interest whatsoever in the stock and yet he may vote
it." (4) It is obvious that where non-voting stock has been
issued there is a separation of beneficial ownership and voting
power ab initio. True enough, the opporients of voting trusts
usually condemn non-voting stock more violently even than vot-
ing trusts. However, it is significant that Illinois is a lonely
and notable exception to the general rule of statute and case
law which permits the issuance of non-voting stock. 5
In view of these analogies, and the fallacies involved in the
arguments leveled against voting trusts, it appears that the vot-
ing trust is beyond reproach both as a corporate and a trust de-
vice. The all important question remains: Is the likelihood of
misconduct and fraud so great in connection with the voting
trusts that they should be banned despite their legal invulner-
ability otherwise? Judge Baldwin would have answered this
in the affirmative fifty years ago,50 Mr. Untermyer twenty-five
years ago,57 and perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas now.58 They can
all point to cases of grave abuse. However, such cases are greatly
outnumbered by the legions of voting trusts which have been
operated with success and without abuse. Unfortunately any
amount of research and study will not reveal the percentage of
cases where there has been abuse. That the percentage is very
small seems apparent from the fact that no opponent of the
voting trust device has shown more than a few glaring and
isolated cases of abuse. Thus the opponents of voting trusts
must rest their case for the most part on the possibility of abuse. 59
54People v. Robinson, (1883) 64 Cal. 373; Thompson v. Blaisdell,
(1919) 93 N. J. L. 31, 107 Atl. 405. In such a case, the buyer may ob-
tain a proxy as part of the transaction in order to protect himself; if the
seller votes, however, there seems to be no requirement that he vote in
the interests of the buyer.
"
5 lllinois, constitution, art. XI, sec. 3; and see People v. Emmerson,
(1922) 302 Ill. 300, 134 N. E. 707 (depriving preferred stock of vote held
unconstitutional).
561Baldwin, Voting Trusts, (1891) 1 Yale L. 1. 1.57Untermyer, A Legislative Program to Restore Business Freedom
and Confidence (1914) 24.5sDouglas, Democracy in Industry and Finance (March 24, 1937) p. 12,
supra, note 3.59It is remarkable that no evidence was introduced pro and con be-
fore the Pujo Committee in 1913 (see note 22)- to show generally whether
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On that basis and with as good reason they might urge the
elimination of corporations and trusts as well.
Suspicion is no substitute for proof under our system of law,
and over against it text writers, lawyers and business men every-
where testify to the utility of voting trusts and to their repeatedly
successful operation. Further eloquent testimony is found in the
collective judgment of a score of legislatures which have approved
v6ting trusts.
STATUTES
Writing thirty-five years ago in support of the validity of
voting trusts, a reviewer concluded with these prophetic words:
"It seems probable that if the courts fail to sustain such arrange-
ments, the desired result will be reached by statute."0  At that
time the first general voting trusi: statute had just been adopted
in New York"' but it does not appear that the reviewer knew it.
The prophecy was slow of fulfillment, for only five other states
passed voting trust statutes within the ensuing quarter of a cen-
tury.62  However, fourteen states enacted such statutes within
the period from 1926 through 1934.62 The Uniform Business
Corporation Act which was approved by the Commissioners on
Uniform Laws in 1928 was no dcubt influential in this legislative
progress because of the excellent section in it providing for the
creation of voting trusts. 64  However, since Washington passed
its statute in 1934, no other state has joined the ranks. It is to
be hoped that the legislative grist-mill will not be long idle.
Statutes are not a complete cure for judicial confusion or even a
sure inoculation against future litigation. Nevertheless, they are
of great importance in setting public policy in favor of voting
voting trusts had been beneficial or detrimental. Cushing, Voting Trusts
(1st ed. 1915) p. 23. In a recent SEC report on real estate reorganiza-
tions, it is said, "Results to date of reorganizations or liquidations accom-
plished under these voting trusts and liquidation trusts are too meagre for
adequate appraisal. But the risk of grave abuse of the tremendous power
vested in these trustees is great . . ." SEC Report on Protective and Re-
organization Committees, (1936) Part III, p. 206.
60(1902) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 756.
6 1New York, Laws 1901, ch. 355.
62Maryland, Ann. Code (Flack Stipp. 1935) art. 23, sec. 133 (1908);
Delaware, Rev. Code. (1935) sec. 2050 (1925) ; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws
Ann. (Skillman 1927) sec. 6546 (1925); Nevada, Comp Laws (Hillyer,
1934) sec. 1621 (1925) ; New Jersey, Rev. Stat. (1937) 14: 10-10 (1926).
63Arkansas, Dig. Stat. (Crawford & Moses Supp. 1931) sec. 1701q.
(1927), California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Code Ann. (Throckmorton 1936) sec. 8623-34 (1927),
Pennsylvania, Philippine Islands, Tennessee, Washington, and West Vir-
ginia (for citations omitted see supra note 7).
649 Uniform Laws Ann. 82 et seq.
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trusts and in prescribing limitations and requirements for their
creation, operation and termination.
But when policy is thus determined, an important question
arises which sooner or later must be answered: Must all voting
trusts comply with the requirements of the statute in order to be
valid? In one of the leading voting trust cases, Matter of Morse,65 a
voting trust agreement for the shares of stock of the Bank of
America had been drawn up under the New York voting trust
statute which provides that all shareholders may become parties
to the agreement. Before a majority of shares had been deposited,
the New York statute was amended so that it did "not apply to
a banking corporation." 6  Thereafter other shareholders de-
posited shares, with the result that the voting trustees held a
majority of the stock. The trustees' right to vote this stock at
a subsequent election of directors was challenged and a unani-
mous court granted the motion for a new election. In reply to
the argument that the trust agreement was valid at common law,
the New York Court of Appeals said, through Pound, J.:
"No voting trust not within the terms of the statute is legal
and any such trust so long as its purpose is legitimate coming
within its terms is legal. The test of the validity is the rule of
the statute. When the field was entered by the legislature it
was fully occupied and no place was left for other voting trusts."
This seems to answer the question emphatically in the affirmative.
While the court refused to permit voting trusts for shares of cor-
porations expressly excepted from the statute,6 7 it is perhaps still
open to question in states where the voting trust statutes apply
merely to business corporations, 8 whether there may be valid
common law voting trusts for other classes of corporations.
This holding of the New York court of appeals would prob-
ably be followed in most jurisdictions today, and yet the indica-
tion that where there is a statute no voting trust may be justified
on common law principles is expressly abrogated by the statutes
in Colorado69 and Ohio.7 0  The Colorado provision is a wise
35(1928) 247 N. Y. 290, 160 N. E. 374.
6'3 New York Laws 1925, ch. 120.67See also New Hampshire, Pub. Laws (1926) ch. 226, sec. 15 as added
Laws 1931, ch. 104, secs. 15-20; West Virginia, Code Ann. (Mich. 1932)
sec. 3085. For an interesting case see Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCormack,
(Tenn. 1939) 125 S. W. (2d) 151 (act prohibiting voting trust of stock
of domestic insurance companies held- unconstitutional).68Minnesota Stat. (Mason Supp. 1936), sec. 7492-26; Pennsylvania
Stat. (Purdon 1936), tit. 15, sec. 2852-511.69Colorado, Stat. Ann. (Michie 1935) ch. 41, sec. 40.
Ohio, Code Ann. (Throckmorton 1936) sec. 8623-34.
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one aimed to protect valid voting trusts created under common
law principles before enactment of the Colorado statute, for it
has several times been argued that the passage of a voting trust
statute shows a new public policy in favor of the validity of
voting trusts as opposed to invalidity before passage of the act.
This weak a posteriori argument as applied to the Delaware
statute has been rejected by the federal circuit court of appeals
for the eighth circuit,7 ' but was accepted by the Delaware court
itself in a very recent opinion.7 1 Other states adopting voting
trust statutes should copy the Colorado statute in this regard so
as to forestall any such decision as has been handed down in
Delaware.
The Ohio statute stipulates that rights under the statute shall
not limit rights at common law, and that it may be provided
in a voting trust that it is to be governed by the common law. 73
These clauses indicate a receptive attitude toward voting trusts
in Ohio, but when taken together with other amendments in
1929 which changed the character of the Ohio statute from man-
datory to permissive, they emasculate the statute and tend to
create confusion among bench and bar in that state.
It is impossible within the compass of this article to analyze
in detail and to compare carefu[ly the statutes already enacted
in twenty states on the subject of voting trusts, but the specific
statutes deserve some mention. An examination of their various
provisions reveals an interesting but sometimes discouraging
diversity. All too often it seems that the drafters of a particular
statute have reached into the grab-bag of existing provisions and
inserted in their codes the clauses that were drawn out. It is
to be regretted that only Idaho, Louisiana, and Washington
have adopted section 29 of the Uniform Business Corporation
Act in its entirety. The uniform section on voting trusts was
7'Macldn v. Nicollet Hotel, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783.
72Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (Del. 1937) 191 At. 823.
It is interesting to note that this case was decided just a few days after
the principles of the Mackin Case bad been affirmed in Western Pacific
R. Corporation v. Baldwin, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 269.
73"The rights conferred by this section shall be in addition to rights
at common law, and no limitations established by this section shall limit
rights at common law.
"If it is desired that any such agreement shall be considered and held
to have been made under and pursuant to the common law and not under
or pursuant to this section, the agreement may so state, whereupon it shall
be so considered and construed by all courts." Ohio, Code Ann. (Throck-
morton 1936) sec. 8623-34 (1929). See also Berry, Voting Trusts under
the Ohio General Corporation Act, (1932) 6 U. Cin. L. Rev. 64.
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drafted with great care, as even a brief summary of its provisions
will show.
Paragraph one provides that two or more shareholders of
a domestic corporation may form a voting trust for a period
not exceeding ten years. Paragraph two provides that a dupli-
cate copy of the agreement shall be filed in the registered office
of the corporation and shall be open to inspection by shareholders
and depositors. Paragraph three provides that other share-
holders may participate in the voting trust.74 Paragraph four
provides for the surrender of stock certificates and the issuance
of new certificates to the trustees, upon which notice of the trust
agreement shall appear. Paragraph five provides for the execu-
tion and delivery of voting trust certificates and for their free
transferability. Paragraph six provides that the trustees shall
have all voting and other rights in the stock subject to the terms
of the agreement. Paragraph seven provides that unless other-
wise provided the trustees may vote in person or by proxy, that
a majority thereof shall determine the vote, that vacancies shall
be filled by remaining trustees and that a trustee shall incur no
responsibility except for his own neglect or malfeasance. These
provisions in the Uniform Act make a reasonable and workable
statute which many states would do well to follow. Paragraph
seven is the only one which is prefaced by the words "unless
otherwise provided," and the lack of such a phrase in the other
paragraphs indicates that the draftsmen intended that the other
provisions should be mandatory.
There are very few places where the uniform voting trust
statute needs correction. P.aragraph three might well be amended
so as to provide that other shareholders "of the same class or
classes provided for in the agreement" may transfer their stock
to the trustee.75 In the absence of such a provision it is uncer-
tain whether all shareholders of a corporation may become parties
to the agreement or merely those of a particular class to whom
the agreement specifically applies. If the former, and if the
agreement provides for substitution of trustees and direction by
74Such a provision should be inserted in every statute and every voting
trust agreement, but, unfortunately it is all too often omitted from voting
trust agreements and the voting trust statutes in California, Delaware,
Michigan, Minnesoa, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia
have no such provision. Cf. Stevens, Handbook on Corporations (1936) 477.
See Note 46, supra.
75Nevada has such a provision. Nevada, Comp. Laws (Hillyer 1934)
sec. 1621.
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the cestuis que trustent, conceivably a group of unforeseen parties
may dominate the trust with unexpected results. 76  Paragraph
five in so far as it provides that "... trustees shall execute and
deliver voting trust certificates . . ." should be changed from a
mandatory to a permissive provision. As a matter of fact certifi-
cates of beneficial interest are almost always given to depositing
shareholders. However, under the modern statutes the share-
holder has adequate protection without such a certificate, and
there may be cases where for reasons of economy in time and
money, it would be better not to go through the formality of
issuing voting trust certificates. Another change that might
well be made in the uniform statute involves the provision that
vacancies among the trustees shall be filled by the remaining
trustees. A clause should be added providing that in the event
of the lack of trustees caused by the death or resignation of a
sole trustee or of a whole trustee slate, new trustees should be
selected by a court or by a majority of the depositing share-
holders subject to the agreement. Of course, such a clause
is often supplied in the agreement or in other statutes of the
state relating to fiduciaries. It would also be wise to provide that
the trustees are entitled to vote shares which are not withdrawn
at the termination of the trust.7 7  Such a provision will prevent
disenfranchisement of shares during the period from termination
to withdrawal. Sometimes this provision is inserted in a voting
trust agreement, but unless the governing statute contains it
also, the agreement is subject to attack on the ground that the
voting trust extends beyond the period permitted by statute.
The uniform act leaves blank the space where the number
of years duration of trusts should be inserted. The maximum
term permitted is ten years in Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Wash-
ington. Arkansas, Maryland, and New York all had statutes
limiting the duration of voting trusts to five years before making
the change to a ten year term, but now the Philippine Islands
is the only jurisdiction with a five year period.7 8  Any limit
76See: 1 Dodd and Baker, Cases on Business Organization 344, footn.
4, p. 346.
77Mich. Comp. Laws (Mason Supp. 1935) sec. 1935-34; Tenn. Code
Ann. (Williams 1936) sec. 3733.
7sPhilippine Islands Corporation Law sec. 36. The Philippine Islands
also has the express proviso that no agreement shall be entered into for the
purpose inter alia of lessening competition or creating a monopoly of any
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may prove unsatisfactory in an individual case, but general prac-
tice and economic considerations seem to have established ten
years as a fair term during which the voting power of stock
may be separated from the beneficial ownership thereof by
means of the voting trust device. Such a period is ordinarily
adequate for the fulfillment of the purpose of a particular voting
trust, whether it has been formed to protect new money, old
money, corporate infancy, or some other legitimate object. Min-
nesota and Nevada provide for a maximum term of fifteen years,
and California goes so far as to provide that no "voting trust
shall be irrevocable for a period of more than twenty-one years.179
Such periods seem too long in an age when business is undergoing
violent changes. An opportunity should probably be given share-
holders once every ten years to decide whether or not to continue a
voting trust arrangement. Furthermore, the California statute,
like the Ohio statute, raises a problem of construction because of
the unfortunate expression just quoted as to irrevocability. It
is not clear whether a voting trust for a longer period than the
statute prescribes would be invalid at the end of the statutory
term or merely revocable.8 0 At such time the trust would seem
to become merely revocable, but the presence of the dual possi-
bility demonstrates the error in draftsmanship. There have been
intimations in various opinions that voting trusts will be illegal
regardless of statutes if they are of indefinite duration."'
There is very little in the statutes regarding extension of
voting trust agreements or renewal thereof. Ohio has a pro-
vision allowing extension for additional periods of ten years each,
but it makes no provision for the withdrawal by dissenters at
the time of a given extension, an omission which seems to be
a mistake. The insertion of such a provision in a very recent
amendment to the Delaware act8 2 and in the New York statute
recently enacted to regulate voting trusts in connection with real
estate reorganizations,8 3 is a favorable indication of the develop-
line of commerce. It is assumed elsewhere that voting trust statutes do
not remove the objection to voting trusts tending to create monopoly, to
restrain trade, or to lessen competition.7 19 t should be noted, however, that California, like Minnesota, provides
that unless otherwise specified in the agreement, the voting trust may be
terminated at any time by the majority in interest.
805 Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. ed. 1931) sec. 2087.81See: People v. Burke, (1923) 72 Colo. 486, 212 Pac. 837; Morel v.
Hoge, (1908) 130 Ga. 625, 61 S. E. 487; Thibadeau v. Lake, (1925) 40 Idaho
456, 234 Pac. 14S.82Delaware, Laws 1935 ch. 148, sec. 2.83New York, Laws 1936 ch. 900.
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ment and cross-fertilization which is going on in the field of
voting trust legislation.
Although the statutes make little provision for renewal or
extension agreements, such clauses are often inserted in voting
trust agreements. A late case in New York, Kittinger v. Churchill
Ezangelical Ass'n, 4 involved a voting trust created for a ten
year term but with a clause authorizing the trustees to renew
the agreement at the expiratiori of the term. The court gave a
declaratory judgment in the tenth year of the operation of the
trust in which it held that the provision was invalid, being a
violation of the New York statute limiting voting trusts to ten
years' duration. However, the clause was found to be severable,
and the trust was held to be in effect until the end of the ten
year period. In a case such as this the court has three alterna-
tives before it: (a) It may declare the whole trust invalid re-
gardless of a severability clause, on the ground that the invalidity
permeates the whole trust. It is submitted that this would be
an extreme view to take.8s  The New York court of appeals
said in the Morse Case that, "The voting trust agreement must
exist in its entirety or it ceases to be valid." 86  The court, how-
ever, was not adverting to a question of severability, and con-
sequently it seems unlikely that it would reverse the Kittinger
Case result on the basis of a statement in fact directed to quite
a different purpose. The provision for renewal does not neces-
sarily mean that the statute will be infringed, but merely that
it may be. (b) The better view is that of the Kittinger Case
itself, namely, that the renewal clause is severable and the trust
therefore valid for the original period. This should be true
whether or not there is a severability clause in the voting trust
agreement. (c) It has been suggested that the voting trust
be governed by the common law after the statutory period has run.
84(1934) 151 lMisc. Rep. 350, 271 N. Y. S. 511.
85However, in a recent Delaware case the court took a view hostile
to voting trusts in construing a statute (Delaware, Rev. Code (1935) sec.
2050) similar to the New York statute in the Kittinger case. Perry v.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (Del. Ch. 1937) 191 AtI. 823. A voting
trust agreement was held completely invalid on the ground it was created
for a period of eleven years, when in fact there was 'strong evidence that
the date of termination was erroneously included as April 1, 1941, instead
of April 1, 1940, and the original agreement provided for an extension period
of ten years if desired. As so often happens, the court was no doubt in-
fluenced by evidence of self-interest on the part of the voting trustees. See
the companion case, Lippard v. Parish, (Del. Ch. 1937) 191 Att. 829, and
comment on these cases in (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 508-511.
86(1928) 247 N. Y. 290, 303, 160 N. E. 374, 378.
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We have already seen, in the Morse Case, that this view is re-
jected in New York, as, in the interests of certainty, it surely
ought to be.
Due to the possibility that a voting trust may be completely
invalid because of a renewal clause it would seem wise to leave
such a clause out altogether in drafting agreements unless an
applicable statute permits its insertion. If the shareholders want
to continue the voting trust when the time comes for renewal,
they may decide to do so. A majority should not be allowed
to force dissenters to renew; a fortiori no trustee should be
allowed to force all shareholders to renew beyond the statutory
period. It is a clear violation of. statutory intent to vest in the
trustees the right to decide upon renewal after the time limit
of the statute has been reached.
In concluding a brief discussion of voting trust legislation,
something should be said regarding the recent amendment to the
Real Property Law of New York 7 which sets up new standards
for the financing and refinancing of real estate operations. This
legislation was the result of the findings and recommendations
of a joint committee of the New York Legislature organized
early in July of 1935 "for the purpose of aiding and assisting
distressed investors in real estate." The committee, under the
chairmanship of Hon. Saul S. Streit, made its report early in
1936. s . It closely parallels the survey of committees for holders
of real estate bonds submitted to Congress by the Securities and
Exchange Commission shortly afterward."9 In both investiga-
tions the testimony related in large measure to S. W. Straus &
Co. and the protective and reorganization committees controlled
by that company. The findings and recommendations in both
reports are strikingly similar. The Streit Committee reported
that "it has only been able to scratch the surface,"90 but legisla-
tion has resulted which seems free from the earmarks of haste
and bids fair to afford protection to New York real estate
investors in the future. The sections regarding voting trusts
provide inter alia that: (a) only certain persons are eligible to
become voting trustees under a plan of reorganization of real
estate unless others are approved by the court and the consent
87New York, Real Property Law sec. 130-c.8BReport of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Bondholders'
Committees, etc., New York State Legislative Document (1936) No. 66.8 See SEC Report on Protective and Reorganization Committees
(1936) Part III.9(Report, p. 7.
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of holders of at least 51 per cent of the mortgage investments
is obtained, or unless a plan of reorganization has been duly
approved by the court; (b) the compensation of voting trustees
shall be subject to court approval; and (c) unless approved by
the court no voting trust agreement shall be valid for longer
than five years and no voting trusfees shall continue to act at
the expiration of the term unless a new or extension agreement
has been entered into and approved by 51 per cent of the stock."'
Although no reason or recommendation for fixing the term at
five years was given in the Streit report,"2 the reduction from the
customary ten-year period seems advisable in view of the great
fluctuation in real estate values and the adequate provision made
in the new statute for extension agreements.
On the whole the history of voting trust legislation in New
York state is a model which other states would do well to copy,
argue as one will, pro and con, as to particular clauses that have
been enacted into law. First came a general statute in 190103
settling the public policy of the state in favor of corporate voting
trusts which complied with certain "requirements." Second, the
period of permissible duration was extended from five to ten
years. Third, the statute was made inapplicable to banking
corporations, though by an amendment which, it must be admitted,
sacrificed precision on the altar of brevity."4 And finally, specific
limitations have been placed upon voting trusts in real estate
reorganizations. Thus we find a state (and fortunately there
already are others like New York) where voting trusts have been
the subject of frequent litigation, but for thirty-five odd years
bench and bar have not wrestled with the question of the validity
per se of voting trusts. Amendments have been made to suit
business convenience and to meet economic necessity, and statutes
have been added to protect the rights of the investing public in
ad hoc situations.
Capital red letters ought to be used for the statement that the
legality (or illegality) of voting trusts is a legislative and not
a judicial question. "It is more a question for the legislature to
9'This last clause seems to have been drafted in view of the decision
of the Kittinger Case, (1934) 151 Misc. Rep. 350, 271 N. Y. S. 511.
92The SEC report indicated tha: S. W. Straus & Co. used the full
twenty-one year period allowed for its voting trusts in California and the
ten-year period for its issues in New York, until, due to newspaper criticism,
they came to provide for referenda as to termination at two-year intervals.
Report, supra, note 89, pp. 203-4.
93New York, Laws 1901, ch. 355.
94New York, Laws 1925 ch. 120.
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use judgment in protecting shareholders by surrounding their
agreements with proper limitation rather than for courts to set
them aside as against public policy." 95  Thus the present legisla-
tive approval of voting trust agreements in twenty states is a
substantial contribution to the law of corporations. It is greatly
to be desired that the states without statutes will soon fall into
line, ending the uncertainty as to the validity of voting trusts and
prescribing regulations and standards for their orderly operation.
PROBLEMS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
With such variety among the statutes and diversity among
the decisions regarding voting trusts, it becomes important to
know what law will govern the creation and administration of
any specific trust. Shareholders of a Delaware corporation will
not want to form a voting trust in Illinois if it can be declared
invalid by the law of Illinois. Similarly Pennsylvania shareholders
of an Idaho corporation will be anxious to know (or at least
their counsel will !) whether to follow the provisions of the Penn-
sylvania or Idaho statute if a voting trust is to be created and
administered in Philadelphia.
The first and perhaps the leading case on the question of
the law governing the legality of voting trusts is It re O'Gara
Coal Company,0 which involved a New York bankruptcy cor-
poration doing business and having its principal office in Illinois.
It was claimed that certain corporate action was not effective
since the directors were elected by voting trustees under a
voting trust which was invalid under the Illinois law. The federal
circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit flatly rejected the
claim with these words,
"We find nothing, however, in the statutes of Illinois or the
decisions of its courts that would deny to stockholders of a New
York corporation the right to make valid voting trust agree-
ments, and no statute or decision to show that Illinois excludes
foreign corporations from doing business in the state on account
of the corporation's compliance with the regulations of the
chartering state, and we reject as untenable the claim that these
votes were illegally cast."197
This seems to be a holding that the law of the state of incor-
poration governs the validity of a voting trust of corporate shares
no matter where the trust is formed.98 The holding is particu-
larly strong since the business of the New York coal company
05Heck, Voting Trusts, (1919) 3 Marq. L. Rev. 158, 169.DO(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1919) 260 Fed. 742.
07At p. 745.
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was done in Illinois, the trust was executed and administered
there, and the settlors-beneficiaries resided in Illinois.
There are a few other cases where this choice-of-law prob-
lem has been present where unfortunately it has gone un-
answered.9 However, despite the lack of a positive holding,
these cases all seem to lend support to what we may hope and
expect to be the fixed rule in the near future, namely, that the
law of the state of incorporation is the sole criterion of the
validity of voting trusts. There are several reasons for such a
rule. It will produce certainty, a result greatly to be desired in
the law of conflict of laws.10 It prevents persons outside the
state of incorporation from obtaining control of a corporation by
a device which would be invalid within the state.' 0' On the
other hand, it avoids invalidation of a voting trust which is valid
in the state of incorporation, but which would be invalid where
the shareholders reside and form the trust. As the O'Gara Case
clearly points out, no paramount public policy of the forum
condemns a voting trust which is valid in the state of incorpora-
tion. Furthermore, it is logical and natural that voting rights
in shares of stock should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state of incorporation by whose ultimate authority they
were granted.
Any number of additional arguments in favor of testing
the validity of voting trusts by the law of the state of incorpora-
tion does not save us from a dilemma when a corporation is incor-
porated in two or more states. Consolidated railroad systems
have often been incorporated contemporaneously in more than
one state, and the stock issued by such a corporation is equally
attributable to all the corporations simultaneously formed. If,
for instance, the Northern Central Railroad System had been
incorporated in both Virginia and North Carolina as well as
98See also Bouree v. Trust Francais des Actions de la Franco-Wyoming
Oil Co., (1924) 14 Del. Ch. 337, 127 AtI. 56, where a Delaware court sus-
tained an arrangement similar to a voting trust, a device alien to French
law, which had been set up in France in order to facilitate trade in and
control of shares of a Delaware corporation.
99Leroy Sargent & Co. v. McHarg, (1919) 42 S. D. 307, 174 N. W.
742; Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Dickey, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1921)
269 Fed. 942; Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 25 F.
(2d) 783.
100cf. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, (1933) 47
Harv. L. Rev. 173, 181, footn. 16.
11Cf. Hutchison v. Ross, (1933) 262 N. Y. 361, 187 N. E. 65 (personal
inter vivos trust, invalid at settlor's domicile, sustained under New York
law).
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Maryland and Pennsylvania 02 and its stock placed in a voting
trust, the legality of such a voting trust could not be determined by
any of the existing rules. The choice of the law would have to de-
pend upon a judicious balancing of various factors, with particular
emphasis being given to the place of administration. In such a
case a court would want to take into consideration the state where
the principal office is, where the trust is or is intended to be
executed and administered, the state or states where the trustees
are domiciled and where the beneficiaries reside, where the voting
is to be done, etc. Of course the law as to legality in the various
states where incorporation had been taken out would be a most
important factor, and as in other fields of the conflict of laws,
the problem is likely to be resolved in favor of the law sustaining
the voting trust.'
Some writers argue that many factors should be taken into
consideration in all choice of law questions, but there seems to
be no reason or necessity for such elasticity in choosing the law
to govern the validity of voting trusts, except as noted above in
connection with corporations incorporated in several states. The
attempt to bring more flexibility into the law regarding the prob-
lem of the law to govern inter vivos trusts has resulted only in
confusion. Such confusion is perhaps justified in the case of
inter vivos trusts because it represents the struggle to get away
from the impractical continental maxim "mobilia sequuntur
personam" imported by Mr. Justice Story about a century ago.
However, no such flexibility of rule is necessary when it comes
to the law applicable to voting trusts. The voting power of
corporate stock emanates from rights granted by the state of
incorporation and its law alone should govern. That state has
granted the corporate "birth certificate" from which come the
voting rights, and it alone (as between jurisdictions) is con-
cerned with the manner in which the voting power is to be
exercised. Our whole framework of state incorporation is based
on such a conception, even though the parental interest which a
state like Delaware has in the thousands of corporations "born"
there may sometimes be exaggerated. Furthermore, the manner
of exercising the voting power of stock is an internal affair of
every corporation, and settlement of such affairs is almost always
-
02See Northern Central Ry. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., (1927) 152
Aid. 94, 136 At!. 66.
103See Creighton, Interstate and International Living Trusts, (1930)
50 Trust Companies 741, 742.
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left to the state of incorporation."' Even if another forum
assumes jurisdiction of the controversy, the law of the state of
incorporation is invariably applied. 10 5
Thus for reasons of simplicity, certainty and convenience
and because the question of the voting rights of stock is an
internal affair of every corporation, the validity of voting trusts
should be governed by the law of the state of incorporation. What
little authority there is on the subject gives emphasis to this
view, as we have seen.
The writer believes that the same rule should apply in deter-
mining the law to govern the administration of a voting trust.
No decisions squarely in point have been found but the case of
Simms v. Garrett"'° seems to be the key to the right answer. That
case involved a voting trust of the stock of a Wyoming corpora-
tion. All the books, records and funds of the corporation were
located in West Virginia, and a majority of the stock was owned
by West Virginia citizens. In rejecting the contention that voting
rights of the voting trustees were to be governed by the terms of
the West Virginia statute, the court stated that if the statute
were to be given such an effect, "we would be imposing the policy
of West Virginia as to the operation of voting trusts upon a
Wyoming corporation."' 10  The court inferred that the law of
the state of incorporation was to govern the administration as
well as the validity of voting trusts. Although there are alter-
natives,' 08 this appears to be the best rule, since administration
of a voting trust, like the larger question of the exercise of voting
power, is an internal affair of a corporation, and as such it should
be subject to the law of the state of incorporation. It seems as
reasonable and convenient that the appointment or removal of
voting trustees, the filing of their accounts, and other administra-
tive matters should be governed by the law of the state of incor-
O14Wason v. Buzzell, (1902) 161 Mass. 338, 63 N. E. 909; Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co., (1933) 288 U. S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652,
89 A. L. R. 720.
1O5Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., (1933) 288 U. S. 123, 130, 53 Sup.
Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652, 89 A. L. R. 720.
106(1933) 114 W. Va. 19, 170 S. E. 423.
'
0 Simms v. Garrett, (1933) 11L W. Va. 19, 22, 170 S. E. 423, 424
(italics ours).
103(1) The law of the state where the trust is to be administered, "the
seat of the trust." Restatement, Conflicts, sec. 315; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (1920) 360; or (2) the law of the state where the trust is to be ad-
ministered except in so far as it is inconsistent with the express administra-
tive provisions of a voting trust statute in the state of incorporation; or (3)
the law of the state which has the most substantial connection with the trust.
See note by Professor Cook, (1919) 19 Col. L. Rcv. 486, 488.
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poration as that directorships and various corporate reports and
acts should be governed by the same law. Any wrongdoing on
the part of any persons connected with a voting trust can still
be dealt with in the jurisdiction where it occurs.
It remains to be seen how far these rules may be changed
by statute or by the parties to a particular agreement. If we
follow the formal logic of Professor Beale, we allow intention
to play no part in the law of conflict of laws governing contracts
(and surely a voting trust is a contract), for otherwise we make a
legislative body of any two persons who choose to act together
and contract. 10 However, there is an increasing body of authority
in sympathy with the belief that "There are no insuperable
barriers to allowing the parties to select any law having a sub-
stantial connection with the agreement, or, indeed, the law which
will sustain it."I °10 The Ohio statute on voting trusts for instance
provides that "shares issued by a foreign corporation may be
made the subject of an agreement under this section.""'1  A
similar provision was recently incorporated in the New York
Personal Property Law relating to inter vivos trusts, permitting
parties to choose their law,"12 but again the writer can see no
substantial reason for bringing about such flexibility in the conflict
of laws rules for voting trusts. Shareholders' rights of all kinds
are circumscribed by the constitution and statutes of the state
of incorporation and by charters and by-laws stemming from
that authority, and it is therefore not establishing new law to hold
that the state of incorporation has the sole right to determine
the legality and fix the administrative requirements of all voting
trusts of the stock of its corporate children. It is building on a
firm foundation.
DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT
The questions of the legality of voting trusts and the law
applicable to them have never been the only battlegrounds for
cases on this subject. Jurisdictional questions involving the right
109See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, (1910) 23
Harv. L. Rev. 260, 263.
110(1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 1251; Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
New England Investors Shares, (D. Mass, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 493, 495
supports the "intention" theory by what has been termed an "ill-considered"
dictum; and see Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws, (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 655 et seq.
"'Ohio, Code Ann. (Throckmorton 1936) sec. 8623-34.
"'-New York, Personal Property Law sec. 12a., as amended in 1933;
and see Hutchison v. Ross, (1933) 262 N. Y. 381, 187 N. E. 65.
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to attack the validity of voting trusts,1" 3 controversies over the
duties, powers, and liabilities of voting trustees, 1" 4 tax litigation
concerning the ownership or transfer of voting trust certifi-
cates"'-these, and myriad other inevitable problems have found
their way into the law reports in unending succession. It is not
the purpose of this article to reconcile conflicts in the decisions
nor to attempt to arrange them in an harmonious pattern. It is
more important to find ways and means to forestall future litiga-
tion over voting trusts. As has already been pointed out, statutes
are a great help toward this end, but regardless of statutes con-
siderable insurance against litigation is gained by careful drafts-
manship of voting trust agreements. To the end that voting trusts
may be immune to attack, the writer recommends that the follow-
ing precautions be taken in drafting and operating the usual voting
trust agreement, regardless of statutes or decisions which may seem
to make them unnecessary :116
(1) The agreement should state fully the purpose or purposes
for which the voting trust is formed.
"23Some cases have held that parties to a voting trust agreement may
not object to it on the principles of pari delicto, estoppel, or consent, etc.
Landstrom v. Johnson, (1935) 281 Ill. App. 470; Smith v. California Thorn
Cordage, (1933) 139 Cal. App. 93, 18 P. (2d) 393, Chapman v. Bates, (1900)
61 N. J. Eq. 658, 47 Ati. 638; Winsor v. Coal Co., (1911) 63 Wash. 62,
114 Pac. 908. See Smith, Limitaticns on the Validity of Voting Trusts,
(1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 627, 637. It has been held that transferees from
parties to a voting trust agreement nray not question its legality. Mackin v.
Nicollet Hotel, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783. Some cases allow
only participating shareholders to object. Willson v. Waltham Watch Co.,(D. Mass. 1933) 293 Fed. 811; Griffith v. Jewett, Zimmerman v. Jewett,
(Cin. Super. Ct. 1886) 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 627, 15 Week. L. B. 419.
114The duties of a voting trustee correspond to those of directors of a
corporation. Purdy's Beach, Private Corporations (1905) sec. 704e. For
this reason voting trustees may be held liable for a breach of trust, although
they will not be regarded with quite the strictness of ordinary trustees.
Bray v. Jones, (1926) 190 Wis. 578. 209 N. W. 675; Alderman v. Alder-
man, (1935) 178 S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897. An action against a trustee for
breach of duty must be a representative suit on behalf of all certificate
holders. Smith v. Bramwell, (1934) 146 Or. 611, 31 P. (2d) 647. On the
question of voting trustees' right to vote by proxy see: Chandler v. Bellanca
Aircraft Corp., (1932) 19 Del. Ch. 57, 162 Atl. 63; In the Matter of Green
Bus Lines, (1937) 166 Misc. Rep. 803, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 556.
The expense of a voting trust may not be borne by the corporation unless
all the shareholders participate in the trust: Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard &
Wheat, Inc., (1935) 290 Mass. 434, 195 N. E. 769.
"'5State Tax Commissioner v. Commissioners of Baltimore County,
(1921) 138 Md. 668, 114 AtI. 717. For an interesting conflict in transfer
tax cases, see Matter of Consolidated Automatic Merchandising Corpora-
tions, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 598; Consolidated Equities, Inc. v.
White, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1935) 78 F. (2d) 435, and Pennroad Corp v.
Ladner, (E.D. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 575.
"16These suggestions are also made lest this article suffer completely
from a serious defect of many, in that they are written for judges, professors
and students, with not enough thought of the practicing lawyers.
VOTING TRUSTS CURRENTLY OBSERVED
(2) The agreement should be created for a fixed period not
to exceed ten years. It is safer to leave out renewal provisions
altogether,'1 7 but if a renewal clause is inserted it should provide
for withdrawal of dissenters at the end of the original period.
(3) The agreement should recite a valuable consideration
other than the mutual promises of the depositing shareholders. 81 s
(4) The duties of the voting trustees should be set forth at
length.
(5) A duplicate copy of the agreement, together with a list
of the parties thereto, should be filed in the registered office of
the corporation, and it should be open to inspection by both
shareholders and depositors or their attorneys.
(6) Every other shareholder of the same class or classes
covered by the agreement should be permitted to transfer his
shares to the voting trustees upon the terms and conditions of
the agreement.
(7) Notice of the voting trust arrangement should be clearly
marked on the certificates and the transfer books.
(8) The trustees should have all voting rights of the stock
except that such stock should not be voted by the trustees in
favor of the sale, mortgage or pledge of all or substantially all
of the assets of the corporation or for any change in the capital
structure or the powers of the corporation or in connection with a
merger, consolidation, reorganization, or dissolution, except with
the written consent of the holders of voting trust certificates
representing at least a majority of the stock subject at the time
to the voting trust agreement." 9
(9) Voting trustees should be selected from among the
shareholders.
(10) It is safer to provide that no voting trustee may be a
director or officer of the corporation, or of any of its subsidiaries,
although the writer admits that there are many situations where
the directors and officers are the persons best qualified to act
as voting trustees, and where they should be permitted to act as
such.
117See supra, p. 367.
M11 See Alderman v. Alderman, (1935) 178 S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897.
12Of course such limitations should not be imposed in the frequent
instances where a voting trust is organized for the purpose of selling the
assets of a corporation or effecting a merger, reorganization or dissolution.
Unless otherwise permitted by the agreement, a trustee's vote has been held
to be limited to carrying on the ordinary business of the corporation, and
cannot be exercised to dissolve the corporation. Re Firstbrook Boxes, Ltd.,
[1936] Ont. Rep. 15, [1936] 1 Doam. L. Rep. 92.
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(11) It should be provided that any profit realized by any
voting trustee from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any security of the corporation or any subsidiary thereof
within any six months period is, subject to certain exceptions,
recoverable by the corporation. 20
(12) Careful attention should be given to the insertion of
provisions regarding the manner of voting by the trustees, the
right to vote by proxy, the filling of vacancies among the trustees
and the standard of care imposed upon the trustees.
There are other precautions which it may be wise to take in
particular cases, but those listed above afford a large measure of
protection for the shareholders who participate in the voting trust
agreement, and should prove to be persuasive evidence of validity
before any court where the agreement might be subjected to
attack.
CONCLUSION
A survey of voting trusts through three-quarters of a century
from 1864 to date leads to certain almost inevitable conclusions.
The legal arguments against voting trusts are without sub-
stance. The voting power and beneficial ownership of stock are
not as inseparable as the Siamese Twins, as some would have
them. The public policy argument behind the claim that they are
inseparable was a smoke screen in the early days for a prevalent
feeling that every combination was a conspiracy and in more
recent years it has sometimes been a camouflage for paternalism
in stock buying. It is impossible to bar public policy from the
decisions of our courts, and yet it is not the judicial function
under our Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence to determine
public policy when broad sociological and economic considerations
are involved. This is a legislative prerogative. If voting trusts
are to be considered invalid, it is for the legislature to say so.
The fact that twenty legislatures have given voting trusts
affirmative approval and none has declared them invalid is a
persuasive record that public policy favors voting trusts. Such
policy is strongly buttressed by the thousands of cases where
voting trusts have proved of great benefit to all concerned. In
some instances it is true that voting trusts have led to abuse, yes,
12OThis conforms to recent federal legislation, aimed at profiteering from
inside information. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, sec. 16(b). Such
a provision was inserted in the United Telephone voting trust and helped
to gain the approval of the SEC thereto, See In the matter of The United
Telephone and Electric Company, (SEC 1938) Holding Company Act
Release No. 1187, p. 8.
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even "corporate kidnapping." Such abuse has been widely de-
nounced, as it should be. This article is in no sense an apology
for instances where unscrupulous bankers or executives have used
the voting trust as a direct, or indirect vehicle for personal
aggrandizement. However, cases of abuse are only a small frac-
tion of the total. 1 ' It is important not to plow up the whole
field in order to eliminate a few weeds. The weeds of abuse in
the field of voting trusts can be killed by the salt of corrective
legislation.1 22
Because trusts of all kinds are coming up for investigation
in these years of depression, and because of the attacks of Mr.
Justice Douglas and others upon voting trusts, there is some
fear that the legislative trend in favor of voting trusts will be
retarded and that the courts will again take a hostile attitude
toward them. The writer was much encouraged by the action
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in approving a plan
of reorganization of the United Telephone and Electric Company
which included a voting trust.12' It is true that there were some
new provisions in that voting trust giving added protection to the
shareholders, but such approval by the body whose chairman had
121LSee Cushing, Voting Trusts (rev. ed. 1927) 21; Professor Dewing
has minimized the abuse of voting trusts and met the criticism that he had
failed to emphasize the "dangers of abuse" of voting trusts in one of his
books by stating that "Everything in this world of ours is subject to the
dangers of abuse, from man's procreative powers to gooseberry tarts at
Thanksgiving." Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (3d ed. 1934)
396-7. One text-writer has gone so far as to say that in his experience,
"... he has never known of a voting trust that was not wisely administered
or whose existence was inimical to the best interests, of the corporation
and of its stockholders." 19 Fletcher, Corporations, (Perm. ed. 1933)
sec. 8986. Abuse is also minimized in Ballantine, Manual of Corporation
Law and Practice (1930) 587-8 and Berle and Means, The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property (1932) 78.2 2 See New York, Real Prop. Law sec. 130-c., supra, note 87; earlier
the New York legislature banned voting trusts in banking corporations,
supra, note 66. Congress may someday place restrictions on voting
trusts like that set up by the Pennroad Corporation on the ground they
constitute evasions of the Transportation Act. (The Pennroad Corpora-
tion Voting Trust Agreement expired in May 1939, after a stormy life
of ten years). See Form 16-K, required by the SEC to be filed annually
by voting trustees of registered issues, setting forth facts as to the trust
and the interest of the trustees in the corporation. Such forms may be
required in the future by state securities commissions as a protection for
investors.
223n the matter of the United Telephone and Electric Company, (SEC
1938) Holding Company Act Release No. 1187. It is interesting to note
that the SEC "seems impressed by the need for creditor control under
certain circumstances and appears to be ready to sanction the voting trust
device as a permissible means of exercising that control." Meck and
Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 216, 229.
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branded the device as "corporate kidnapping" a short time before
is a very significant step in the right direction. Moreover, one of
the predominant reasons for approving the trust was the economic
necessity of the situation--continuity of control was imperative in
order to obtain a satisfactory executive to head the company. 24
An attitude antagonistic to voting trusts fails to consider
legitimate economic necessity and commercial expediency and
overlooks the actualities of countless situations. These elements,
present in nine out of ten voting trust situations, are sufficient jus-
tification for the general acceptance of voting trusts. No longer
should each voting trust be forced to justify itself.125 The legality
of all voting trusts, except those expressly forbidden by statute,
should be assumed. It is as superfluous to state that voting trusts
are valid if for proper purposes as it is to say the same about an
ordinary contract. Illegality ought only to be decreed if there
has been a fraudulent, improper or monopolistic design in the
execution of a voting trust. Of course, relief should be swiftly
granted if there has been misconduct on the part of the voting
trustees or the shareholders participating in the trust.
The usual voting trust insures stability of policy and con-
tinuity of management, provides protection for shareholders, cor-
poration and creditors alike, and fixes responsibility in a small,
select group of fiduciaries during a difficult or dangerous period
in a corporation's'history. Since the eventual outcome is normally
beneficial to all concerned, we may urge with Lord Bowen that
"law should follow business." Business and bar have used voting
trusts widely and well for over fifty years and it is high time
that all courts and legislatures approve them in principle. Ade-
quate sanctions exist or may be invented for the relatively few
cases where "corporate kidnapp-ng" exists in practice.
1241n the matter of the United Telephone and Electric Company,
(SEC 1938) Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, p. 7.125For the most severe rules requiring a justification for each voting
trust, see Marion Smith, Limitations on the Validity of Voting Trusts,
(1922) 22 Col. L. R. 627.
